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INTRODUCTION
Classical economists have long argued that trade and labor migration
are functionally the same.1 When goods move freely across borders, they
contend, each country can export what it produces more cheaply than other
countries and import what other nations produce at a lower price. As a result, all participating countries realize economic gains. Likewise, the argu*
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. The author thanks Adam Cox, Robin Lenhardt, Julian Mortenson, Alvaro Santos, Richard Squire, and Chantal Thomas for very helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this Essay, and extends deep appreciation to Jessica Jenkins, Nicholas Rosado, Brittany Scott, and Andrew Wachtenheim for their invaluable research assistance.
1
See infra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
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ment goes, global wealth is maximized when workers are free to sell their
labor abroad for more than they could earn at home, but less than employers
in their destination country would have to pay native workers.
Of late, some policymakers have drawn on these parallels in launching
a call to expand migration as a form of global development policy.2 Although there is much to say about this approach, I hold my fire until the end
of this Essay. Instead, my primary purpose here is to explore the underlying asymmetry that economic theory obscures. There are similarities between the movement of people and the movement of goods, but the
differences between the two are far more apparent. If labor migration and
trade are so alike, why have many developed nations maintained high barriers to migration even as barriers to trade have fallen sharply? The contrast
between the weak global patchwork governing the movement of people and
the strong framework governing the movement of goods is another sign of
those distinctions. Why has the United States aggressively pursued multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements on trade while remaining stubbornly unilateral in its approach to labor migration?
This Essay addresses these questions, which surprisingly have received
little attention in the law review literature.3 I begin by mapping the current
state of global governance of trade, investment, and immigration to make
the divergence between these regulatory schemes clear. I sharpen the point
by contrasting one kind of global regulation used in all three cases—
bilateral agreements—to demonstrate the limited scope and enforceability
of country-to-country accords on labor migration, where they exist at all,
compared to those governing the flow of goods and capital.
To explain why the global structures regulating migration do not resemble those governing trade and investment, it is necessary to go beyond
the consistent story of factor mobility told by economists. With regard to
the more restrictive posture taken by destination countries regarding migration, although trade and migration have some parallel impacts, the flow of
human beings has political, cultural, social, and economic effects that differ
from the flow of money and goods, and these effects play out politically in
developed nations in distinct ways. In addition, the distribution of the
2
See, e.g., WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION 25–26 (2005) [hereinafter GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006].
3
Howard Chang has made the argument that immigration should be treated more like trade. See
Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1153, 1232–44 (1997). Kevin Johnson has drawn attention to
the disparate treatment of trade and immigration, see Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican Immigration to the United States, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 937, 965–70
(1994), and has used trade as an analogy to support his call for open borders, see Kevin R. Johnson,
Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 235–40 (2003). Recently, Jagdeep Bhandari has parsed the interrelationship between migration and trade policies. See Jagdeep S. Bhandari, Migration and Trade
Policies: Symmetry or Paradox?, 6 J. INT‘L BUS. & L. 17, 38–41 (2007). But as far as I know, the law
review literature is devoid of efforts to explain the fundamental asymmetry in global structures.

1110

104:1109 (2010)

People Are Not Bananas

wealth generated by migration appears to differ from that of wealth generated by trade or capital flows, with a greater portion of the economic gain
going to the migrants and their countries of origin. This reduces the incentive for developed nations to advocate for increased migration. Furthermore, the fact that trade is reciprocal while migration is generally a oneway flow creates significant domestic political obstacles to the expansion of
immigration in destination nations, and impedes the negotiation of migration issues between countries. With regard to the lower level of coordination that destination countries have pursued for migration, it is important to
note that the benefits that developed nations receive through labor migration are, unlike the benefits of trade and foreign investment, almost always
available through unilateral action rather than through negotiation with developing countries. These differences are reflected in the divergent paths
that nations have taken to regulate trade, investment, and labor migration.
If this explanation of what developed countries stand to gain by resisting increased labor migration and rejecting regional or multilateral approaches to its coordination is persuasive, it raises the question of why they
ever negotiate with developing nations on this front. I conclude by offering
some thoughts in this regard and—more profoundly—by suggesting how
we might better approach labor migration in order to maximize wealth and
distributive justice on a global scale.
I. TRADE, IMMIGRATION, AND WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
From the perspective of classical economics, freer trade and freer
movement of workers function in similar ways to increase global wealth.
The explanation lies with the principle of wealth maximization in a context
where countries have unequal endowments of resources, or ―factors,‖ of
production: land, labor, and capital. Under a regime allowing for the free
movement of goods across borders, each country will export whatever its
factor endowments allow it to produce at a lower cost than other goods, and
will import whatever is most costly for it to produce.4 All participating
countries will gain economically as a result. Likewise, if migration barriers
are removed between countries with substantially different wages, workers
from low-pay nations will be permitted to find work in high-pay nations at a
wage higher than they could earn at home, but lower than employers in the

4
This is Ricardo‘s theory of comparative advantage. DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 80 (Everyman‘s Library, 1911) (1817). Building on David
Smith‘s theory of absolute advantage, which posits that all countries are made better off by trade where
they export the products that they can produce more cheaply than other nations and import those that are
more expensive for them to produce, Ricardo argued that even where a country has no absolute advantage in production costs over other nations, all countries are better off where each trades the goods it can
produce relatively cheaply for the goods that are more costly for it to produce. For an overview of the
evolution of economic theories of trade, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 2–6 (3d ed. 2005)
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high-wage country would have to pay native workers.5 Global wealth will
be maximized in this context as well.6 Economists have also made analogous arguments about capital flows, an important point for the purposes of
this Essay since the global regulation of foreign investment has developed
along a path closer to trade than to immigration.7 Foreign direct investment
is the movement of capital to a country where it can generate a profit greater than that available in the investor‘s country. Classical economists argue
that the greatest efficiencies are achieved when capital, like goods or labor,
can flow freely to where it is most productive.8
This Essay focuses on the question of why the argument that trade, foreign investment, and labor migration are functionally the same does not appear to be reflected in the reality of global regulation of the mobility of
goods, capital, and people. Over the past twenty years, countries have
largely behaved as if the economists‘ wealth-maximizing theory about trade
and investment were true. They have acted to increase their citizens‘ opportunities to buy and sell goods and invest (or receive investment of) capital across borders, largely through agreements negotiated with other
nations. This is true both of relatively wealthy and relatively poor countries.
On the other hand, many wealthier immigrant-destination nations have
behaved as if economists have gotten it wrong about labor migration, particularly migration involving low-skilled workers. They have often sought
5

Labor migration is generally understood as an example of absolute rather than comparative advantage. See Timothy J. Hatton, Should We Have a WTO for International Migration?, ECON. POL‘Y, Apr.
2007, at 339, 359, 364.
6
See JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ECONOMIC MIGRATION 36 (2009); Chang,
supra note 3, at 1148–49; Michael J. Trebilcock, The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy, 5
AMER. L. & ECON. REV. 271, 275–76 (2003) (―[N]eoclassical economic theory suggests that an optimal
immigration policy would be not to have one at all.‖).
7
See Magnus Blomström & Ari Kokko, Regional Integration and Foreign Direct Investment 2–3
(Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6019, 1997).
8
Nonetheless, calls for the liberalization of capital have not generated as much consensus as calls
for freer trade. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 64–66 (2002); Benn
Steil, The End of National Currency, 86 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 83, 83 (May/June 2007) (―Even such an impeccably credentialed pro-globalization economist as U.S. Federal Reserve Governor Frederic Mishkin
has acknowledged that ‗opening up the financial system to foreign capital flows has led to some disastrous financial crises causing great pain, suffering, and even violence.‘‖). Jagdish Bhagwati, an ardent
supporter of free trade, has likewise expressed concern about the negative impact of free capital flows.
See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 202–07 (2004). The volatility that accompanies capital flows, caused in part by investor behavior that cannot be explained by rational actor models,
endangers the stability of countries that have opened their doors to foreign investment to a greater extent
than the flow of goods. See STIGLITZ, supra, at 67–73.
On the differences between trade, labor, and capital markets, see ASSAF RAZIN & EFRAIM SADKA,
LABOR, CAPITAL, AND FINANCE 8 (2001) (explaining that markets in goods are less likely to deviate
from classical assumptions of perfect competition with complete information and no distortions, while
both labor and capital markets are ―notorious for their imperfections,‖ which in the case of labor markets
include unions, state regulation, incomplete information, and payroll taxes; and in the case of capital
markets include moral hazards, herd behavior, and debt and bank runs).
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to limit the movement of workers into their economies. And although the
movement of people at first glance seems at least as likely as the movement
of goods or capital to require global coordination, where destination countries have created temporary labor migration regimes they have largely done
so unilaterally or bilaterally, rather than through the regional or multilateral
arrangements long favored in the trade and investment contexts.9 As a result, the regulation of migration differs from its trade and investment counterparts along two dimensions: it is more restrictive and it reflects a lower
level of international coordination.10
A classical economist might seek to explain this apparent inconsistency
by contending that wealthier countries‘ aggressive pursuit of free trade policies will obviate the need for more open migration. From a developedcountry perspective, if a free trade regime allowed all jobs to be outsourced
to where workers were cheaper, there would be no need for labor migration
to serve the same ends. However, service industries and other locallyrooted work now make up the bulk of the U.S. economy. 11 Outsourcing of
labor overseas is rarely a viable option in these contexts, and service industries have therefore led the call for more open labor migration in the United
States.12 From a developing-country perspective, economists have used the
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model to argue that trade and labor migration
substitute for each other.13 Under this formulation, an increase in trade will
9
A few definitions are helpful at the outset. A bilateral agreement is one involving only two parties.
A multilateral agreement is any accord involving three or more parties. Websters New World College
Dictionary Online, http://www.yourdictionary.com/multilateral (last visited Aug. 7, 2010). However,
following common practice in the field of international law, I distinguish between ―regional‖ agreements, which bind a set of geographically proximate countries, and ―multilateral‖ agreements, to which
a diverse array of countries without a geographical relationship are parties. Int‘l Mar. Org., Treaties:
General, http://www.imo.org/InfoResource/mainframe.asp?topic_id=904&doc_id=4442 (last visited
Aug. 7, 2010). I reserve the label of ―global‖ or ―international‖ for agreements that incorporate a large
majority of the world‘s nations.
10
It is important to note that the two dimensions do not necessarily correlate. In other words, it is
possible to have a more open labor migration regime that is achieved unilaterally than one that is negotiated between states.
11
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in July of 2010 service and construction workers in
the United States outnumbered manufacturing workers by a ratio of over 8 to 1. These calculations are
based on government data. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—July
2010, at 28–30 (Aug. 6, 2010) available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf.
12
For example, although the Essential Worker Immigration Coalition (EWIC), the principal employer coalition lobbying for immigration reform in the United States in the mid-2000s, describes itself
as ―a coalition of businesses, trade associations, and other organizations from across the industry spectrum,‖ EWIC, http://www.ewic.org/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2010), service industries overwhelmingly dominate the EWIC‘s membership list, see EWIC, Members, http://www.ewic.org//index.php?option=
com_content&task=view&id=48 (last visited Aug. 7, 2010).
13
RAZIN & SADKA, supra note 8, Chapter 2 (―Factor Mobility and Trade in Goods: Do They Substitute for Each Other?‖); Bhandari, supra note 3, at 28–30. The argument begins with the classic Heckscher-Ohlin model, a refinement of Ricardo‘s theory, which states that countries will have a comparative
advantage in the production of goods that use large amounts of their relatively abundant factors, and will
specialize in the production of those goods, which as a result will lower their prices; they will trade them
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lead poorer countries to specialize in a way that takes advantage of their abundant factor: unskilled labor. They will begin producing more laborintensive goods, thus increasing employment opportunities for low-skilled
workers and raising the wages that those workers can command. With
more and better jobs available at home, the citizens of poorer countries will
have less need to move abroad in search of work. Thus, the argument goes,
freer trade will decrease the need for labor migration.
Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, the argument that trade and migration were substitutes provided an important theoretical underlay to the
United States‘ trade negotiations with immigrant-origin countries, particularly Mexico. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was
explicitly promoted to the Mexican and U.S. public on the grounds that it
would, in the words of Mexico‘s president at the time, permit Mexico ―to
export goods and not people.‖14 In this way the economic theory provided
an independent justification for the agreement beyond free trade, and also
answered critics who said that a true economic integration agreement
should address the movement of people as well as goods.15
for goods produced with factors in which they are relatively scarce. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note
4, at 4. Samuelson extended the basic model to include the factor-price equalization theorem, which
states that free trade will tend to equalize factor prices between countries. PETER J. BUCKLEY &
MICHAEL E. BROOKE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 7 (1992).
When applied to the immigration context, as by Bhandari and others, the Hecksher–Ohlin–
Samuelson framework would suggest that ―International trade and migration are indeed complete substitutes, with regard to their effects upon relative wages in the two countries. Free trade alone erodes the
incentives to migrate and free labor mobility alone would eliminate the basis for mutually profitable
trade.‖ Bhandari, supra note 3, at 30. Nonetheless, Bhandari acknowledges that the reality has proven
considerably more complex, and that ―the strong substitute relationship between trade and migration has
not manifested itself.‖ Id. at 28. Razin & Sadka note that ―if the only difference between the two countries lies in their relative labor abundance, then commodity trade and labor (or capital) mobility are perfect substitutes.‖ Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, International Migration and International Trade, in
HANDBOOK OF POPULATION AND FAMILY ECONOMICS 851, 861 (1997). In Labor, Capital, and
Finance, however, Razin and Sadka point out that where countries are technologically unequal, trade
―does not necessarily equalize wages and may even widen the wage gap, thereby generating more incentives for labor mobility.‖ RAZIN & SADKA, supra note 8, at 26.
14
Patricia Fernández-Kelly & Douglas S. Massey, Borders for Whom? The Role of NAFTA in
Mexico–U.S. Migration, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98, 105 (2007) (citing LYUBA
ZARSKY & KEVIN P. GALLAGHER, AMERICAS PROGRAM, NAFTA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND
SUSTAINABLE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO 1 (2004) (quoting President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari)). On the selling of NAFTA on the grounds that it would reduce migration, see Jeff Faux, How
NAFTA Failed Mexico: Immigration Is Not a Development Policy, AM. PROSPECT, July–Aug. 2003, at
35, available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=how_nafta_failed_mexico; Manuel RoigFranzia, Behind the Debate: Propelled to Protect, Driven to Migrate, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2006, at
A1; Louis Uchitelle, Nafta Should Have Stopped Illegal Immigration, Right?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2007, Week in Review at 4.
15
See, e.g., Dolores Acevedo & Thomas J. Espenshade, Implications of a North American Free
Trade Agreement for Mexican Migration into the United States, 18 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 729, 731
(1992) (―[B]y eliminating protectionism within North America and by increasing foreign investment in
Mexico, Mexico‘s structural adjustment program and NAFTA will help reduce Mexican migration to the
United States.‖). For a similar argument in the Eastern–Western European context from the same era,
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Fifteen years after NAFTA, however, it is beyond dispute that this
model was inaccurate as a predictor of the impact of increased free trade on
Mexico‘s migration patterns. Mexican migration levels to the United States
rose sharply in the wake of NAFTA, and were sustained for over a decade.16
Between 1990 and 2000, the population of foreign-born Mexicans in the
United States more than doubled, from 4.3 million to 9.2 million,17 peaking
at 11.6 million in 2008.18 The factors contributing to this outcome are complex, but can be briefly summarized as follows:19 Foreign capital flowed
quickly into Mexico after NAFTA. In agriculture, a mainstay of the Mexican economy, the result was the replacement of small-scale farmers with
agribusiness conglomerates. A number of the farmers and farm workers
displaced as a result of this shift migrated directly to the United States; others went to Mexican cities and to the growing export-production sector in
search of work. When the Mexican economy was unable to produce
enough good jobs to absorb these workers, many of them, too, continued
northwards into the United States.20
In the wake of the discrediting of the theory that trade can be counted
on as a ready substitute for migration, economists have increasingly turned
to the argument that migration itself can be a powerful engine for wealth
creation and therefore for development. They have argued that the potential
gains from more open labor migration dwarf those from freer trade.21 One
see RAZIN & SADKA, supra note 8, at 25 (―International trade . . . can act as a substitute for migration. A
free trade pact that ensures Eastern European countries access to the Western European market is the
best single migration policy that could be put in place.‖ (quoting RICHARD LAYARD, OLIVER
BLANCHARD, RUDIGER DORNBUSCH & PAUL KRUGMAN, EAST–WEST MIGRATION 51 (1992))).
16
JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
POPULATION IN THE U.S. 4 (2006) (―The Mexican-born population in the United States, including both
legal and unauthorized migrants, has grown by about 500,000 people a year for the past decade.‖); see
also Uchitelle, supra note 14 (stating that in the early 1990s the Mexican-born population in the United
States grew at less than 400,000 per year).
17
Elizabeth Grieco, The Foreign Born from Mexico in the United States, MIGRATION INFORMATION
SOURCE (October 1, 2003), http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=163.
18
JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D‘VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS: HOW
MANY COME? HOW MANY LEAVE? 6 fig. A-1 (2009), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/112.pdf.
19
For nuanced explanations of how NAFTA failed to deliver the promised economic benefits to
Mexico, see Bill Ong Hing, Nafta, Globalization, and Mexican Migrants, 5 J. L. ECON. & POL‘Y 87, 97–
102 (2009) Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Broken Promise of Nafta, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at A23; Raúl
Delgado Wise & Humberto Márquez Covarrubias, The Mexico–United States Migratory System: Dilemmas of Regional Integration, Development, and Emigration 8, 11 (2006) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author). For a very useful discussion of the interaction between NAFTA and other aspects
of economic policy in Mexico that led to increased migration, see Chantal Thomas, Migration and Social Regionalism: Labour Migration as an Unintended Consequence of Globalization in Mexico, in
SOCIAL REGIONALISM IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Adelle Blackett & Christian Lévesque, eds.) (forthcoming 2010).
20
See SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 113–20 (1998); Uchitelle, supra
note 14, at 3; Wise & Covarrubias, supra note 19, at 7–9, 11.
21
See LANT PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE COME 4 (2006); GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006,
supra note 2, at 41; Hatton, supra note 5, at 345–46; Terrie L. Walmsley & L. Alan Winters, Relaxing
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often-cited model predicts that a relatively small increase in world migration would generate $52 billion more in world income than the removal of
all remaining restrictions on trade in goods.22 Meanwhile, the World Bank
estimates that if developed countries permitted labor migration to increase
their labor force by three percent, the global gains by 2025 would be $356
billion.23 Increasing low-skilled labor migration appears to deliver even
greater gains than increasing high-skilled migration, because of greater
wage differentials and the fact that its impact is felt across a larger number
of sectors.24 But this only sharpens the question with which this Essay
opens: If freer trade and migration both have the power to increase global
wealth, and if migration offers by far the greater global returns, then why
does migration (and particularly low-wage migration) lag so far behind
goods and capital in levels of permissible mobility and the degree of intercountry cooperation?
II. COMPARING THE GLOBAL FRAMEWORKS FOR TRADE,
INVESTMENT, AND IMMIGRATION
In the United States, the suggestion that immigration policy could or
should be created through dialogue with origin countries is often met with
puzzlement, if not outright disdain.25 The last time the United States approached low-wage labor migration as a matter to be negotiated with a migrant-origin country was in the early years of the Bracero program, when
the signing of an accord with Mexico brought more than four million Mexican guest workers into U.S. fields between 1942 and 1964.26 Since then,
with rare and minor exceptions, the U.S. government has set its labor immigration policy unilaterally.27 While the United States regularly negotiates
the Restrictions on the Temporary Movement of Natural Persons: A Simulation Analysis, 20 J. ECON.
INTEGRATION 688, 690 (2005); Dani Rodrik, Comments at the Conference on Immigration Policy and
the Welfare State 1 (June 23, 2001), available at flash.lakeheadu.ca/~mshannon/Rodrik1.doc. The
comparison generally is between removing all remaining barriers to trade versus a relatively small increase in the flow of labor (as opposed to total openness, which generates estimates of enormous global
gains but is politically infeasible). Hatton supra note 5, at 345–46.
22
Walmsley & Winters, supra note 21, at 690.
23
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006, supra note 2, at 31. By contrast, Walmsley & Winters,
making different assumptions about labor markets in developed countries, estimate that a three percent
increase would result in world welfare rising by $156 billion. Walmsley & Winters supra note 21, at
690.
24
See Walmsley & Winters, supra note 21, at 690, 713, 723.
25
See, e.g., Ruben Navarrette, Jr., Official Blame Game Equally Popular on Either Side of U.S.–
Mexico Border, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 13, 2007.
26
For overviews of the Bracero program, see generally KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE
BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. (1992); ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF
LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY (1964).
27
See Demetrios Papademetriou, The Mexico Factor in US Immigration Reform, MIGRATION
INFORMATION SOURCE, Mar. 1, 2004, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?
ID=210. Days before 9/11, U.S. President George W. Bush met with Mexican President Vicente Fox to
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bilateral and multilateral treaties on investment and trade, low-wage labor
migration has been conspicuously absent from these agreements.28 The peculiarity of the United States‘ and other major immigrant destination countries‘ unilateralism in immigration matters, and of the underdeveloped state
of international immigration regimes generally, is perhaps best understood
in comparison with its polar opposite: those nations‘ active pursuit of multilateralism in regimes governing free trade and the movement of capital
around the globe.
A. The International Regulation of Trade and Investment
1. Trade.—A complex web of rules and institutions regulate the
movement of goods across national borders. At the broadest level, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) offers a multilateral framework encompassing 153 of the world‘s nations—the majority of countries in the world,
including all the major powers except Russia.29 The WTO seeks to facilitate the free flow of goods between countries by lowering barriers to trade
and resolving trade disputes where they arise.30 The WTO‘s multilateral regime coexists with increasing numbers of regional accords that bind participating states to mutual commitments of preferential treatment in trade and,
increasingly, to cooperation on other issues like investment, services, and
national security. NAFTA, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and
discuss a framework for Mexican-American migration. The events of 9/11 derailed that conversation,
which has not resumed at the presidential level in the ensuing years. See Muzaffar Chishti, Guest Workers in the House of Labor, 13 NEW LAB. F. 67, 70–71 (2004); Alexandra Delano, From ―Shared Responsibility‖ to a Migration Agreement? The Limits for Cooperation in the Mexico–United States Case
(2000–2008), INT‘L MIGRATION, Sept. 2009, *2-3, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
j.1468-2435.2009.00572.x/pdf. Ironically, one of the very few other situations in which the United
States has engaged in negotiations with a foreign government over immigration (although not labor migration) policy is in the case of Cuba. See Associated Press, Migration Talks with Cuba Put Off to February, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2009, at A17.
28
The United States relied on treaties to regulate migration in the nineteenth century. See Adam B.
Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L. J. 458 (2009). Since
the Bracero agreement, however, it has negotiated no bilateral agreements related to low-wage workers.
Highly skilled labor migration is only occasionally the subject of negotiations between the United States
and other governments. In rare instances, the United States has included provisions for temporary professional migrants in treaties that are primarily about trade. Examples include the TN visa for certain
Canadian and Mexican professionals created by NAFTA (TN is an acronym for ―Treaty NAFTA‖), see
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 16, Annex 1603, app. 1603.d.1., Dec. 17,
1992, Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(e) (West 2009), and the set-aside of 1400
temporary visas for Chilean professional workers with employment offers under the Free Trade Agreement negotiated in 2003, see Kevin O‘Neil, Kimberly Hamilton & Demetrios Papademetriou, Migration
in the Americas 31 (2005), available at http://www.gcim.org/attachements/RS1.pdf.
29
See Members and Oberservers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION http://www.wto.org/english/
theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2010) (noting that the WTO had 153 members as of July 23, 2008, and listing current members with dates of membership).
30
What Is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/
english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2010).
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the Andean Community are a few examples of such accords and associations among many. Almost a third of global trade now takes place under
regional agreements.31
Finally, as multilateral negotiations on world trade have stalled,32 bilateral free trade agreements (BFTAs) have emerged as a favored alternative.
The number of bilateral trade agreements now numbers well over 200. 33
Negotiated directly between nations, BFTAs permit individual countries to
grant each other preferential terms of trade.34 Like regional arrangements
but more limited in scope, bilateral accords generally require signatories to
offer each other trade terms as favorable as those offered to any other nation
(referred to as most favored nation status), and to grant ―national treatment‖
to each other‘s citizens with regard to trade opportunities, protecting the
other signatories‘ citizens as they protect their own.35
The growth in bilateral trade accords has been driven by economically
powerful nations, such as the United States. As of 2007 the United States
had concluded fifteen bilateral free trade agreements and had negotiations
underway for nine more; the EU nations had concluded thirty-two with four
more underway; Singapore had nine signed and twelve underway.36 In this
context, the United States has taken the lead in pursuing choice of forum
clauses and in seeking to use bilateral agreements to press restrictive terms
on its trading partners.37
31
Chris Brummer, The Ties that Bind? Regionalism, Commercial Treaties, and the Future of Global Economic Integration, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1349, 1355 (2007).
32
The Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organization began in 2001 and is currently
stalled over a number of issues. Negotiations were scheduled to resume in 2010, but remained stalled as
of August 2010, and hopes of an agreement are low. See Vikas Bajaj, At Early Forum on Trade, Few
Signs of Concessions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, at B2; Sewell Chan, Hurdles Deter Obama’s Pledge to
Double Exports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010, at B1 (New York edition).]
33
Brummer, supra note 31, at 1363; Robert McMahon, The Rise in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, June 13, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10890/
rise_in_bilateral_free_trade_agreements.html.
34
A number of scholars have expressed the concern that BFTAs contravene the WTO principle of
most favored nation status, which requires that all participating countries grant each other terms of trade
that are equally advantageous. See, e.g., Sydney M. Cone, III, The Promotion of Free-Trade Areas
Viewed in Terms of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and ―Imperial Preference‖, 26 MICH. J. INT‘L L.
563, 563–64 (2005).
35
See Brummer, supra note 31, at 1355–56, 1363.
36
Id. at 1364. India and Turkey also have many agreements. Id.
37
See McMahon, supra note 33, at 3–4; Aziz Choudry, Sleeping Beauty and Prince Charming: Bilateral Deals Are No Fairytale, Z SPACE, June 14, 2003, http://www.zmag.org/zspace/
commentaries/1634; Peter Drahos, The Bilateral Web of Trade Dispute Settlement 3 (2006)
(unpublished manuscript), http://wage.wisc.edu/uploads/WTO%20Conference/drahos.pdf; Bilaterals,
US FTAS, http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?rubrique55 (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
For an example of a choice of forum clause in a trade agreement, see NAFTA Chapter Twenty:
Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures, Article 2005: GATT Dispute Settlement,
NAFTA SECRETARIAT, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343&mtpiID=
153#A2005 (last visited Aug. 8, 2010).
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2. Investment.—Capital flows present a somewhat different picture.
Because of the 1998 failure of efforts by wealthy nations to adopt a Multilateral Agreement on Investment within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)38 and the 2003 breakdown of similar
attempts to include an investment accord in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations,39 there is no international or multilateral scheme governing investment.40 However, foreign investment is often addressed as a side issue in
regional integration accords. Such agreements often encourage the flow of
capital between member states and liberalize the terms on which investment
between participating states takes place, although they rarely offer enforceable protections to foreign investors.41 Increasingly, foreign direct investment is regulated via bilateral agreements. Well over two thousand bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) have been signed in the past twenty years.42
BITs now govern forty-three percent of all global foreign direct investment.43 BITs protect the foreign investments that flow from wealthier countries to poorer ones from expropriation or other forms of conflict.44
Through BITs, signatories guarantee each other most favored nation status
and grant outside investments ―national treatment.‖45 They establish the
terms of compensation for expropriation, and set the forum for the settle-

38
See CHARAN DEVEREAUX, ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL WATKINS, 1 CASE STUDIES IN US
TRADE NEGOTIATION: MAKING THE RULES 135–39 (2006).
39
See Stephen Young & Ana Teresa Tavares, Multilateral Rules on FDI: Do We Need Them? Will
We Get Them? A Developing Country Perspective, 13 TRANSNAT‘L CORPS. 1, 2–4 (2004).
40
Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 266. The WTO does provide limited protections to foreign investments in certain contexts. From Bilaterals to a Multilateral Agreement?, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief07_e.htm (last
visited Aug. 8, 2010).
41
See Oliver Morrissey, Investment Provisions in Regional Integration Agreements for Developing
Countries 5–6 (Ctr. for Research in Econ. Dev. and Int‘l Trade, Research Paper No. 08/06, 2006), available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/credit/research/papers/CP0806.pdf.
42
Chris Brummer counts 2265 BITs signed between 1989 and 2007. Brummer, supra note 31, at
1363.
43
THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 674 (Kenneth A. Reinert & Ramkishen S. Rajan et al., eds., 2009).
44
BITs generally define ―investment‖ broadly. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign
Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT‘L L.
639, 655 (1998) (quoting Model United States Bilateral Investment Treaty, which defines investments to
include tangible, intangible, and intellectual property; licenses and permits; and financial assets such as
stock). This represents an expansion of the earlier international standard on foreign investment
represented in the Hull Rule, which only protected against expropriation in the form of the seizure of
assets. Id. at 644–45, 655. The BIT rule renders any dispute between an investor and a host nation a
matter of international law so long as it grows from an agreement negotiated between them. Id. at 655–
56.
45
See Brummer, supra note 31, at 1363; Guzman, supra note 44, at 654.
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ment of disputes, giving the investor the right to invoke binding arbitration
before an international body.46
Like bilateral trade accords, the use of BITs was initiated by developed
nations. Although less-developed countries have more recently begun to
sign accords with each other, developed countries remain active participants
in shaping the substantive and procedural protections owed to foreign investors under such treaties.47 For many years, less-developed countries took
a collective position within the UN, the WTO, and elsewhere against internationally enforceable investment contracts and limits on expropriation.48
Since the 1980s, however, such countries have proven eager to sign bilateral investment agreements with developed nations (and lately with each other), often agreeing to terms that contravene their prior statements.49
In the contexts of trade and investment, regional and bilateral agreements are widespread; in the context of trade, there is also a comprehensive
multilateral regime. All of these arrangements are binding, in that they detail the fora in which disputes are to be decided and set out economic penalties to be imposed for breach.50 Perhaps not surprisingly, the interaction
46

See Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 40, at 276; Guzman, supra note 44, at 642–43, 654.
See Guzman, supra note 44, at 654. In a later article, Guzman and two co-authors refine the point
about the interaction between home (investor) nations and potential hosts, arguing that ―home countries
make take-it-or-leave-it offers to potential hosts,‖ while ―the decision of whether and when to sign is, to
a large extent, left to the host.‖ Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 40, at 276. This means that
while BIT terms are largely determined by investor nations, signings cluster around the schedule and
needs of host countries. Id.
Quite recently, capital has begun to flow more steadily from developing to developed countries.
Developing nation investors have thus begun to call on the reciprocal protections of BITs, and developed counties have become concerned about the extent of the safeguards they once promoted so enthusiastically. As a result, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT was drafted with more limited definitions of
―investment‖ and ―expropriation‖ than in previous iterations, and in ongoing discussions about a new
model BIT a number of U.S. commentators have argued for further restrictions on protections offered to
foreign capital. 2004 U.S. MODEL BIT, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
117601.pdf. I thank Julian Mortenson for alerting me to this development.
48
See Guzman, supra note 44, at 642–43. Through the movement for a New International Economic Order, developing countries campaigned successfully at the United Nations in the 1970s for the abolition of the Hull Rule mandating ―prompt, adequate, and effective‖ compensation for expropriation. Id.
at 644–51 Instead, they advocated on national sovereignty grounds for a more lenient (and less enforceable) ―appropriate compensation‖ standard. Id.
49
Guzman and co-authors have argued that this reflects the fact that even though as a group lessdeveloped nations would benefit from less stringent rules, their individual national financial interests lie
in signaling their comparative attractiveness as host countries for foreign investment, which they do by
agreeing to broad property protections. Id. at 643, 669–74; Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 40,
at 266, 277.
50
In the case of BITs, for example, the agreements establish dispute settlement mechanisms and
impose a requirement of ―prompt, adequate, and effective‖ compensation for breach. Guzman, supra
note 44, at 657–58. Guzman argues that ―one of the most interesting and potentially influential‖ aspects
of BITs is their protection of contractual rights by ―making any breach of an agreement between the host
country and the investor a violation of an international treaty, . . . [thus] allow[ing] such agreements to
be treated like contracts between private parties within a single country.‖ Id. at 655.
47
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between the various levels of these regimes can be fraught with tension. 51
Nonetheless, these agreements are flourishing as countries seek out a variety of opportunities to maximize economic gains through investment and
trade. The most powerful countries are generally engaged at every available level in negotiating trade and investment agreements, and the least powerful often wish to be so active. As of 2007, for example, the United
States participated in the WTO, was a party to two regional arrangements,
and had negotiated forty-eight BITs and fifteen BFTAs.52
B. The International Regulation of Labor Migration
The limited global map of rules and institutions regulating the migration of workers across borders presents a stark contrast to the many international agreements governing trade and investment. First, labor migration is
much more restricted than trade or foreign investment.53 Second, the regulation of immigration is carried out with much less international coordination than the regulation of the flow of goods or capital. There is no binding
international or multilateral mechanism for the negotiation of rules regarding economic migration, nor is one currently under serious contemplation.
Although parties to a number of regional arrangements established for the
purpose of economic cooperation are currently considering permitting freer
movement of workers between member nations, the principal beneficiaries
of such arrangements are highly skilled migrants. Only the EU has implemented a policy permitting free movement between member states for all
workers. In the absence of other mechanisms governing low-wage labor
migration, bilateral agreements are on the rise, although many are nonbinding, and they collectively regulate only a small percentage of the world‘s
labor migration.
1. The Absence of Multilateral Governance of Immigration.—There
are currently no global or multilateral regimes for the governance of immigration. The closest approximation can be found in the arena of refugee
policy, where the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees
(UNHCR) intervenes with national governments to address refugee crises
and coordinates efforts to resettle the nearly thirty-four million displaced

51
For an exploration of the tensions between bilateral agreements and the regional organizations,
see Brummer, supra note 31, at 1368–71. For an analysis of the conflicts between regional organizations
and the WTO, see, for example, Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 419 passim (2001); Sungjoon
Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 NW. J. INT‘L L. & BUS. 39 (2006) For concerns about the interactions between BFTAs and the WTO regime, see McMahon, supra note 33, at 1, 4; Peter Drahos, Presentation at the Asian Regional Workshop on Bilateral FTAs (Aug. 26–28, 2005), available at
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/FTAs/DisputeResolution/DisputeResolutionAndFTAsPeterDrahos.ppt.
52
Brummer, supra note 31, at 1364.
53
See Trebilcock, supra note 6, at 271–72.
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people worldwide.54 But the UNHCR has no mechanism to compel compliance with its interpretation of the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, nor
are its interpretations of international law binding.55 Furthermore, a large
majority of the world‘s nearly 200 million migrants56 are not fleeing persecution or civil strife and thus do not fall within the UNHCR‘s mandate.
Thus, most human movement across borders is left to individual states to
handle unilaterally, bilaterally, or regionally as they wish.
Both scholars and policymakers of late have offered proposals for
global approaches to coordinating immigration. Bimal Ghosh first made
the case for a ―New International Regime for Orderly Movements of
People‖ in 2000.57 Various other scholars have taken up his call, including
most prominently Jagdish Bhagwati, who in 2003 posited the idea of a
World Migration Organization modeled on the WTO.58 In the policy arena,
the UN-sponsored Global Commission on International Migration called in
2005 for the formation of a UN-based ―Inter-agency Global Migration Facility‖ to ―establish a comprehensive and coherent approach in the overall
institutional response to international migration.‖59 This proposal stops
short of the full World Migration Organization model, but would nonetheless represent a step forward in the global governance of immigration. The
UN General Assembly held its first High Level Dialogue on International
Migration and Development in 2006, but the achievement of a formal structure to coordinate world migration remains elusive.
While formal governance structures remain absent at the international
level, advisory mechanisms abound.60 Other international entities that for54
About Us, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/
49c3646c2.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2010).
55
See James C. Hathaway, Who Should Watch Over Refugee Law?, 14 FORCED MIGRATION REV.
23, 23–24 (2002).
56
The 200 million figure only includes those outside their country for a year or more. GLOBAL
COMM‘N ON INT‘L MIGRATION, MIGRATION IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
ACTION 83 (2005), available at http://www.gcim.org/en/finalreport.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2010).
57
See Bimal Ghosh, Towards a New International Regime for Orderly Movements of People, in
MANAGING MIGRATION: TIME FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL REGIME? 6 (Bimal Ghosh ed., 2000).
58
See Jagdish Bhagwati, Borders Beyond Control, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 98, 101–04 (2003). But see
Hatton, supra note 5, at 368-70 (questioning whether the parallels between trade and immigration are
sufficiently strong to make a WTO model viable in the immigration context). For an overview of recent
calls for a global entity to manage migration, see Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire, International
Migration, Border Controls and Human Rights: Assessing the Relevance of a Right to Mobility, 21 J. OF
BORDERLANDS STUD. 69, 80 (2006).
59
GLOBAL COMM‘N ON INT‘L MIGRATION, supra note 56, at 77; see also id. at 73–78 (for the overall call). The GCIM was brought into existence for eighteen months and concluded in 2005. The UN
initiated the Global Migration Group in response to the GCIM‘s recommendation. Background, GLOBAL
MIGRATION GROUP, http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/background.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2010).
60
A growing number of international organizations advise governments on migration policy, including the International Organization for Migration (IOM) outside of the UN system. For an overview of
the IOM‘s work advising governments with regard to temporary labor migration, see Labour Migration,
IOM, http://www.iom.int/jahia/page706.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2010). To a lesser extent (although
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merly saw immigration issues as outside their purview are beginning to address them. These include the World Bank, which addresses remittances
and development, and the WTO, which facilitated negotiations for the
GATS Mode 4 protocol governing the supply of services across borders.61
A range of fora have emerged to develop migration guidelines and assess
effective practices.62 Finally, new venues that enable the world‘s governments to discuss and debate migration issues directly with each other are
emerging.63 None of these multilateral bodies or processes, however, has
produced a single accord binding participating governments.
2. Limited Regional Governance of Labor Migration.—Increasingly,
geographically proximate states that have entered into trade agreements are
extending those relationships to encompass other aspects of economic and
political integration, including investment, security, border issues, and the
provision of services, as well as labor migration. With the exception of the
EU,64 however, none of these regional accords permits workers at all skill
increasing of late), the UN‘s International Labor Organization (ILO) and other UN agencies have also
become involved in immigration issues. For an overview of international agencies within and outside
the UN that have become involved in immigration issues, see GLOBAL COMM‘N ON INT‘L MIGRATION,
supra note 56, at 72–75.
61
See GLOBAL COMM‘N ON INT‘L MIGRATION, SUPRA note 56, at 72–75. The provisions in the
WTO-administered General Agreement in Trade and Services (GATS) Relating to the Movement of
Natural Persons (GATS Mode 4) exclusively facilitate the temporary movement of service suppliers
across borders. They explicitly exclude those traveling under this framework from access to the labor
market and from a right to permanent immigration. Sungjoon Cho, Development by Moving People:
Unearthing the Development Potential of a GATS Visa, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL
SYSTEM 457, 463–64 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
62
These include the IOM‘s International Dialogue on Migration, the Hague Process on Refugees
and Migration, and the Berne Initiative‘s International Agenda for Migration Management. See THE
BERNE INITIATIVE, INTERNATIONAL AGENDA FOR MIGRATION MANAGEMENT 6–8 (2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/46949e762.pdf. These processes at times involve civil society
groups and the private sector as well as international organizations and states. For a description of a
number of these initiatives, see TRACHTMAN, supra note 6, at 15–23.
63
For example, since 2007 the Global Forum on Migration and Development has begun to convene
destination and origin governments annually for discussion of ―best practices‖ regarding labor migration. See Global Forum on Migration and Development Athens 2009, http://www.gfmd2009.org/205/
section.aspx/355 (last visited Aug. 8, 2010).
64
Free movement of workers within the EU also encompasses citizens of the countries in the European Economic Area (EEA), including Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, and citizens of the countries
in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), including Switzerland. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA,
COORDINATION UNIT, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA: FACT SHEET 4, http://www.llv.li/pdf-llv-sewr-ewrkurzinformation_englisch.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2010).
Australia and New Zealand permit the free movement of each other‘s nationals to live and work in
either country.
The Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Treaty Agreement
(ANZCERTA, commonly referred to as CER) is a trade agreement, with the right of free movement established separately under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement. Because CER only involves two
countries, it offers less insight into a discussion of full regional mobility. See The Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) Trade Agreement: 1983–2003 Backgrounder, NEW ZEALAND
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/0-Trade-archive/0--Trade-agreements/Australia/0-trade-agreement.php (last visited Aug. 8, 2010).

1123

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

levels from any one signatory state to work without restriction and with full
rights in other signatory states.
Since the EU was founded in 1957, it has permitted citizens of member
states to work in any other member state for an unlimited period of time,
with the same workplace rights as nationals.65 Historically, as new member
states are admitted, existing member states have been permitted to limit labor market access to citizens of the newly admitted states for a period of
time, customarily seven years. The EU‘s enlargement in 2004 and 2007 to
include ten central and eastern European countries has followed this pattern.66 Eventually, though, all EU member states will be incorporated in the
free movement regime. The EU‘s commitment to the free movement of
workers between member states is the equivalent of national treatment in
the trade and investment setting.
Outside the EU, a number of regional accords have created mechanisms to facilitate more open movement of high-skilled workers between
signatory states. Under such accords, the movement of low-skilled workers
is typically either forbidden, or channeled through temporary worker programs that are time-limited, often restricted by industry and which permit a
partial array of rights compared to those of native workers. These policies
are consistent with a worldwide trend of increasing openness to skilled labor migration while increasing restrictions on the movement of unskilled
workers.67 The Caribbean Community, for example, allows virtually unrestricted movement by university graduates and professionals between
member states but does not permit migration by low-wage workers.68 On a
more limited scale, NAFTA created a temporary visa that permits a small
subset of highly skilled workers to move temporarily for work among the

65
See Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 48 (as in effect in 1957) (now art. 39),
Mar. 25, 1957, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 57. For a description of the elements of free movement of workers in
the EU, see Free Movement of Workers, EUROPEAN COMM‘N, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=
458&langId=en (last visited Aug. 8, 2010). A citizen of any EU member state is permitted to enter any
other member state without a visa and remain for up to six months. She can stay longer as long as she is
employed or self-employed, a student, a family member of an EU national in one of the qualifying categories, or—if none of those things—able to demonstrate that she does not need social benefits or health
insurance. See EUROPEAN COMM‘N, FREE MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
ftu/pdf/en/FTU_3.2.2.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2010).
66
Cyprus and Malta were also admitted to the EU in 2004, essentially without restrictions on the
movement of their nationals.
Enlargement—Transitional Provisions, EUROPEAN COMM‘N,
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=466&langId=en (last visited Dec. 16, 2009).
67
See ASIAN DEV. BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT: OUTLOOK 2008, at 77, 89 [hereinafter ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK].
68
Protocol II: Establishment, Services, Capital (Protocol Amending the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community), CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY SECRETARIAT (July 1, 1997), http://caricom.org/jsp/
secretariat/legal_instruments/protocolII.jsp?menu=secretariat.
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United States, Canada, and Mexico.69 NAFTA, however, makes no provision for low-wage labor migration.70
A few regional organizations have indicated an intent to eventually
permit movement of low-wage as well as professional workers among
member states. The Economic Community of West African States promises a reciprocal right of ―establishment‖ (i.e., the right to carry out economic
activities, including work) to citizens of its fifteen signatory nations, although that promise has not been realized.71 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa‘s (COMESA) Protocol on the Free Movement of
Persons is still aspirational, but if implemented it will progressively remove
all obstacles to private sector labor mobility among COMESA‘s nineteen
member countries.72 The Andean Community in Latin America, including
Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, and Venezuela, is moving toward regional labor mobility for a defined set of people, including temporary agricultural workers.73
With the exception of the EU, what is notable about the list of nations
contemplating a more open approach to low-wage labor migration on a regional basis is the almost complete absence of the world‘s major migrant
destination countries. The United States, the Gulf states, and Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea, for example, have indicated no plans
to negotiate regional relationships with the countries that represent their
primary sources of low-wage immigrants. EU member states, meanwhile,
have shown no inclination to open labor migration opportunities to lowwage workers from non-EU countries, such as the African nations. Indeed,
the growth in the EU‘s inner circle has been accompanied by increasingly
restrictive policies toward nationals from non-EU countries.74
69

See NAFTA, supra note 28.
See Fernández-Kelly & Massey, supra note 14, at 99.
71
Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment, pt. 2,
art. 2, ECOWAS, http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=ap010579&lang=en (last visited Aug.
8, 2010). On difficulties with implementation, see DILIP RATHA & WILLIAM SHAW, WORLD BANK,
SOUTH–SOUTH MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES 13 box 1 (2007), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/South-SouthmigrationJan192006.pdf (last visited Aug. 8,
2010).
72
See Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Treaty, ch. 28, art. 164,
http://about.comesa.int/attachments/149_090505_COMESA_Treaty.pdf. On difficulties with implementation, see RATHA & SHAW, supra note 71, at 13 box 1.
73
Although the agricultural program is for temporary workers, it offers social and labor protections
that are superior to many guest worker programs. See Decision 545: Andean Labor Migration Instrument, COMMUNIDAD ANDINA (June 25, 2003), http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/
D545e.htm; O‘Neil, Hamilton & Papademetriou, supra note 28, at 32.
At a less-binding level, a number of regional consultative processes have begun to discuss regional
labor mobility as well. Examples include the Colombo Process in Asia; the Puebla Process in North and
Central America, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, and the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA).
INT‘L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, WORLD MIGRATION 2008, at 8 [hereinafter WORLD MIGRATION 2008].
74
See, e.g., Christoper Werth, Marketplace: UK Toughens Laws on Immigration (American Public
Media radio broadcast Aug. 6, 2009), available at http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/
70
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3. Weak but Growing Bilateral Governance of Labor Migration.—
Although bilateral labor migration accords have recently re-emerged
on the global stage, such agreements have long existed as a mechanism to
govern the flow of temporary labor migrants between nations. In the wake
of World War II, for example, Italy signed agreements with Belgium, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France, promising to provide those
countries with guest workers.75 After a lull from the 1970s through most of
the 1990s, the negotiation of such accords has been on the rise over the past
decade.76 In 2004, a survey of the thirty countries that make up the OECD
found 176 bilateral accords governing temporary labor recruitment.77 Until
recently, when enlargement guaranteed a consistent supply of workers from
new EU member states, EU nations were particularly active among the
OECD nations in negotiating bilateral labor migration agreements.78 Latin
American countries have signed more than 140 such agreements.79 AsianPacific and Middle Eastern countries have also begun to negotiate bilateral
agreements about temporary labor migration.80
Major origin countries often have multiple agreements. The Philippines has bilateral labor migration agreements with at least fourteen of the
nations to which it sends its migrants.81 Destination countries may reach
accords with a range of partners as well. Spain, for example, has temporary
labor migration agreements with eight of the countries that make up its immigrant population.82 Despite their growing numbers, the existing agreements regulate only a small percentage of total labor migration between
countries around the world.83 And in most destination countries that nego08/06/pm-uk-immigration/.
75
See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., MIGRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT: BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
AT A CROSSROADS 222 tbl.1.A.1 (2004) (table of bilateral labour agreements signed by OECD member
countries) [hereinafter MIGRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT].
76
See Daniela Bobeva & Jean-Pierre Garson, Overview of Bilateral Agreements and Other Forms of
Labour Recruitment, in MIGRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT, supra note 75, at 11–12.
77
Id. at 12. For a list of OECD countries, see Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Aug.
8, 2010).
78
See MIGRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT, supra note 75, 222 tbl.1.A.1. Many of the EU accords were
with Eastern and Central European countries, and they have been or soon will be obviated by the free
movement guarantees that accompanied enlargement. See Bobeva & Garson, supra note 76, at 26.
79
O‘Neil, Hamilton & Papademetriou, supra note 28, at 32–33.
80
See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK, supra note 67, at 89–90; Bobeva & Garson, supra note 76,
at 11–12.
81
Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, Managing Temporary Migration: Lessons from the Philippine Model, MIGRATION POLICY INST., INSIGHT, Oct. 2008, at 1, 33, available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Insight_POEA_Oct07.pdf.
82
EDUARDO GERONIMI, LORENZO CACHÓN & EZEQUIEL TEXIDÓ, OFICINA INTERNACIONAL DEL
TRABAJO, ACUERDOS BILATERALES DE MIGRACIÓN DE MANO DE OBRA: ESTUDIO DE CASOS
[BILATERAL LABOR MIGRATION AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES] 16, 23, 95, 125 (2004), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/imp/imp66s.pdf.
83
See Bobeva & Garson, supra note 76, at 12, 22.
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tiate such agreements, they serve as a supplement to rather than a comprehensive replacement for the domestically legislated migration regime.84 A
number of major migrant destination countries—including the United States
and many of the Gulf states—have no bilateral labor migration agreements
(BLMAs) at all.
BLMAs governing low-wage workers almost exclusively establish
guest-worker-like programs that tie migrants to a particular employer for a
limited period of time, rather than establishing regimes permitting the free
movement of workers between two countries. These agreements may take a
number of forms, although two are most common: the nonbinding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and the binding bilateral treaty or accord.85 Agreements vary widely in scope, terms, and level of specificity.86
Most accords, however, require a destination country to accept a certain
number of temporary labor migrants from a particular origin country. Often, the agreement sets out the sector in which those migrants will labor,
most commonly agriculture, construction, and domestic work. Some
agreements are quite general; others establish detailed rules governing the
recruitment process, the length of time migrants are permitted to remain,
and the procedures for their return. BLMAs rarely include provisions regarding procedures to be followed in case either party breaches the agreement, or require use of a particular tribunal or process to settle disputes.87
Increasingly, BLMAs are incorporating a role for or regulating the behavior of nongovernmental actors, including recruitment firms, employers‘
associations, civil society organizations, and unions. Recently, some bilateral agreements have begun to include model contracts or statements regarding minimum workplace standards in response to pressure from
migrants‘ rights advocates and from origin countries responding to domestic political outcry about the treatment of migrants abroad. A few agreements now incorporate programs to inform migrants of their rights, while a
small minority create special claims and enforcement mechanisms for those
84

See Martine Durand, Conclusions, in MIGRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT, supra note 75, at 217–19.
See Bobeva & Garson, supra note 76, at 11–15.
86
Bilateral agreements tend to be more detailed, more binding, and more action-oriented than
MOUs. Id.
87
See, for example, the following provisions from an MOU between Indonesia and Malaysia:
Any difference or dispute between the Parties arising out of the interpretation of implementation or
application of the provisions of this Memorandum of Understanding shall be settled amicably
through consultation or negotiation between the Parties through diplomatic channels without reference to any third party.
85

Each Party reserves the right for reasons of national interest, public order or public health to suspend temporarily, either in whole or in part, the implementation of this Memorandum of Understanding. Such suspension will be effective immediately upon issuance of the written notification
to the other Party through diplomatic channels.
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia on Co-Operation on Immigration Matters, Indon.–Malay., arts. 7 & 9, Aug. 8,
2002, available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/6/7/13783.pdf.
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rights. These provisions, however, have largely gone unheeded in practice.88
III. SHARPENING THE CONTRAST: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BILATERAL
AGREEMENTS ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT VS. IMMIGRATION
It is clear, then, that developed countries approach trade and investment very differently than they approach labor migration, in terms of both
the level of openness and the degree of inter-country cooperation that they
see as optimal. This contrast is sharpened by a direct comparison between
the comprehensiveness, protectiveness, and enforceability of the agreements that developed countries make with developing country partners in
each context.
Bilateral investment and trade agreements are far more comprehensive
in their coverage than those governing migration. Investment and trade accords are usually broad in scope, regulating most or all movement of capital
and goods between the signatory countries. Bilateral labor migration
agreements, by contrast, are often quite narrow, setting the terms of movement only for a special (frequently numerically limited) class of migrants,
while other migration between the signatory countries continues outside of
the terms of the agreement.89
Bilateral trade and investment treaties also offer far stronger and more
enforceable protections to the owners of mobile goods and capital than bilateral labor migration treaties offer to the owners of labor (i.e., migrant
workers). As described in Part II.A, bilateral free trade and investment accords carry heavy penalties for violations, set out procedures to be followed
in case of disagreements, and usually incorporate dispute resolution mechanisms or assign disputes to special tribunals. BLMAs, by contrast,
usually guarantee migrants minimal protections, if their rights are mentioned at all. Although a number of newer BLMAs do set out specific
rights for migrants traveling under the agreement, and some experiment
with new mechanisms for the protection of migrant workers, BLMAs rarely
include enforcement mechanisms and are often written as nonbinding
MOUs.
In assessing the strength of the protections offered in these agreements,
it is telling to look at how they interact with domestic law in the signatory
countries. Trade and investment agreements routinely supersede related national laws.90 For example, investment accords that guarantee foreign in88
See Jennifer Gordon, Towards Transnational Labor Citizenship: Restructuring Labor Migration
to Reinforce Workers’ Rights 13–15 (Univ. of Cal.-Berkeley Warren Inst., Policy Paper, 2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Gordon_Transnatl_Labor_Final.pdf [hereinafter Gordon, Restructuring Labor Migration].
89
I have found no satisfactory measure of how much of total world labor migration is regulated
through bilateral agreements as opposed to unilateral domestic law or regional accords.
90
See Guzman, supra note 44, at 654–58, for the extent of protections offered to investors under the
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vestors national treatment generally override domestic laws mandating that
foreign firms (but not native ones) get a certain percentage of their inputs
from within the host country. By contrast, typical labor migration accords
merely supplement domestic laws with regard to the rights of migrants. For
example, South Korea‘s BLMAs with six Asian countries are negotiated
within the terms of South Korea‘s existing Employment Permit system, rather than overriding that law.91
The trade and investment norm of stronger bilateral accords and weaker regional and multilateral agreements is reversed for migration agreements. Bilateral agreements on investment and trade are typically stronger
than regional agreements on investment and trade in that they require more
openness to outside capital and goods in host nations and tie the hands of
domestic actors who would put conditions on investment or restrict trade to
a greater extent.92 Bilateral labor migration agreements present the opposite
picture: they require less openness to labor mobility than their regional
counterparts, and they permit host nations to limit the rights of migrants to a
greater extent than existing or proposed regional labor mobility agreements
allow.
Finally, it is worth noting a difference in the area of uniformity. Bilateral labor migration agreements are often negotiated in secret. Their contents, and at times even the fact of their existence, are frequently not made
public.93 When it is possible to obtain copies, it is evident that the concluded labor migration agreements vary widely in their terms, unlike investment agreements (and to a lesser extent trade agreements) which largely
echo each other‘s terms and language.94
The results of the comparison are consistent. Bilateral agreements on
investment and trade are stronger than those governing labor migration
along every dimension: trade agreements are more comprehensive and require more openness; are more likely to supplant domestic law and exceed

model BIT, including multiple provisions that override domestic laws. He concludes that the typical
BIT renders ―[v]irtually any dispute between host and investor . . . a matter of international law.‖ Id. at
655–56.
91
See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK, supra note 67, at 90.
92
See supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing efforts by the United States and other developed nations to use bilateral agreements to achieve an agenda that has been stymied by the WTO‘s
multilateral forum).
93
See, e.g., DEV. RESEARCH CTR. ON MIGRATION, GLOBALISATION & POVERTY, MIGRATION
PARTNERSHIPS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.migrationdrc.org/news/reports/bmds/session6/
Migration_Partnerships.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2010) (referring to Egypt and Morocco, the report
states that ―[a]lthough both countries have signed diplomatic agreements regarding labour migration
with a number of host countries, these agreements have often been based on private understandings
which are not made public‖).
94
Although the terms of BFTAs vary, they have in common a guarantee of most favored nation
treatment, and a commitment to eradicate tariffs and other barriers to the import of the goods of signatory nations. See Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 40, at 274–77; Guzman, supra note 44, at 654.

1129

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

the protections of regional or multilateral agreements; and are more protective, binding, and enforceable than labor migration agreements.95
IV. WHY DOES IMMIGRATION LAG BEHIND TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN
GLOBAL COORDINATION?
If economists‘ models predict that free trade, foreign investment, and
immigration will behave so similarly in terms of maximizing global wealth,
what accounts for the weak global regulation of immigration as opposed to
the highly developed global mechanisms regulating trade and investment?
The simplest of responses points to realpolitik: trade and investment are
arenas where most nations are aggressively seeking new relationships on
favorable terms, while immigration is an area where developed countries
display considerable ambivalence in the face of developing nations‘ great
interest.96 But this answer begs the fundamental question: if immigration
offers even greater efficiency gains than trade,97 why are developed nations
so reluctant to permit greater openness, and to pursue that goal in coordination with developing countries? In Part I, I noted and rejected an explanation rooted in classical economics: that the difference is accounted for by
the fact that trade and migration are substitutes for each other.98 In this Part,
I argue instead that labor mobility is fundamentally different from the mobility of goods or capital in several ways, each of which contributes either
to wealthier nations‘ reluctance to permit greater global movement of workers, or to their distaste for multilateral structures governing labor migration,
or both.
Before beginning, however, a reiteration of the parallels between kinds
of factor mobility is in order. In the classical economic lineup, trade and
migration appear to produce a similar set of winners and losers. In the trade
setting, if a U.S.-based commercial baker imports flour from abroad, the
95
To note these differences is not to dismiss the importance of the re-emergence of bilateral agreements over the past two decades as a mechanism for governing labor migration. Precisely because of
the fact that that some countries are taking their first modern steps away from unilateral governance of
migration through these agreements, and that even countries that have long had a bilateral approach appear to be using such agreements as ways to experiment with different approaches to labor migration, I
suspect that there is a great deal that could be learned through close quantitative and qualitative analysis
of recent accords.
96
This Essay gives short shrift to the complex, ambivalent, and varied perspectives of developing
countries on migration, not by any means because they lack importance, but because they do not shed
much light on the question that occupies this Essay, to wit, why developed nations have responded in
such disparate ways to the movement of goods and people across borders.
97
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
98
There are two variations of this argument: the outsourcing claim (trade will render immigration
unnecessary because the jobs will move to where the workers are) and the wage equalization claim
(trade will render immigration unnecessary because it will raise wages and increase employment opportunities in less-developed countries). The first has proven untrue because large numbers of jobs in developed countries are locally rooted. The second effect has failed to materialize in a number of cases, as
the wave of migration unleashed by NAFTA illustrates. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
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foreign firm selling the flour benefits from higher prices than it could command in its domestic market. The U.S. baker benefits from cheaper flour.
Consumers benefit from the lower prices of the crackers the baker produces.
The losers are U.S.-based flour producers, whose prices fall as a result of
competition with foreign producers, and their workers, who lose jobs (although as consumers, they also benefit to a very small degree from cheaper
crackers). In the immigration context, if a U.S.-based tomato canning firm
uses immigrant workers on its production line in the United States, the immigrant benefits from higher wages than she could earn at home. The U.S.
firm benefits from cheaper labor. Consumers benefit from the lower prices
of the canned tomatoes. And the losers are the group of workers in the
United States who compete with migrants for jobs; their wages fall because
of the increased labor supply (although they, too, benefit a tiny bit from the
decreased cost of the product).
Furthermore (and not surprisingly, given the similarities just noted),
many of the charges levied against the importation of goods and the importation of labor echo each other. Trade is criticized for displacing workers
from jobs in the importing country, and for replacing traditional products
and practices with foreign ones, threatening national cultures.99 Immigration, too, is criticized for displacing native workers, and for the social and
cultural shifts that it engenders.100 As Timothy Hatton has noted, ―Across a
broad range of countries attitudes are on balance against both imports and
immigration, and the same types of people are against imports as are against
immigration.‖101
And yet, the domestic politics of most developed countries have eventually yielded to the opening of trade despite these distributional and cultural concerns, while continuing to pose an obstacle to the liberalization of
labor migration on the same grounds. In the international arena, this split
translates into the two contrasts I have noted. Developed countries emphatically support increased trade abroad, while advocating and adopting restrictions on immigration. And developed countries pursue negotiations
over trade in bilateral, regional, and multilateral settings, while preferring
unilateralism or limited forms of bilateralism to govern migration. With the
For a critique of free trade‘s cultural effects, see Maude Barlow, The Global Monoculture, EARTH
ISLAND J., Autumn 2001, at 32. For a critique of free trade‘s impact on workers, see Byron Dorgan &
Sherrod Brown, Op-Ed., How Free Trade Hurts, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2006, at A21.
100
For an attack on immigration for its impact on culture, see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE
WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA‘S NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004); for a critique of immigration for its
economic impact, see George J. Borjas, Globalization and Immigration, in GLOBALIZATION: WHAT‘S
NEW 77, 84, 86–90 (Michael Weinstein ed., 2005); and for an attack that mixes both elements, see
MARK KRIKORIAN, THE NEW CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION: BOTH LEGAL AND ILLEGAL (2008).
101
Hatton, supra note 5, at 353. Greenaway and Nelson argue that in the United States, trade policy
(seen as national and economic) is set via ―group politics‖ while immigration policy (seen as local and
social) is set via ―democratic politics.‖ Id. at 359 (citing D. Greenaway & D. Nelson, The Distinct Political Economies of Trade and Migration Policy Through the Window of Endogenous Policy Models, in
LABOR MOBILITY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 25 (Foders & Langhammer eds., 2006)).
99
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exception of the European Union, regionalism is reserved for a few accords
on high-skilled labor migration; multilateralism is unknown.
I explain these divergences as follows. First, labor migration involves
human beings, who behave differently than goods. This behavioral difference elicits a different sort of reaction to their arrival, which in turn shapes
a different set of domestic political forces and incentives. Second, developed nations perceive immigration as having a lower payoff than trade, in
part because trade is largely a reciprocal process, while labor migration is
mostly a one-way street. Both factors reduce the (perceived) economic
gains from immigration and make immigration a more difficult political issue in developed countries. Finally, while wealthy nations cannot achieve
free trade and protections for mobile capital without the cooperation of lessdeveloped countries, they can in almost all cases fill their needs for labor
migrants through unilateral action. Cooperation is only attractive when it
brings destination countries more than they could achieve on their own.
A. People Have Different Impacts than Goods and Capital
Despite the similarities noted above, the arrival of migrants from other
countries affects the economy and culture of the destination country differently than does an inflow of trade or capital. Unlike imported computers
or cars, human beings put down roots, meet partners, have children, send
for family members left behind, and create networks that change recruitment patterns for the jobs where they work. Human beings often speak
languages, practice religions, and have cultural beliefs that differ from those
of the communities they enter. They consume resources. They get sick and
require medical care, have children who enter schools, and go through periods when they can‘t work and need support. Where they are entitled to
access social welfare systems, their needs can put a strain on government
coffers.102 Humans can make compelling arguments that they are entitled to
rights. And eventually, unlike foreign goods and the companies that make
them, foreign humans—or their children—vote.103 As a result, immigration
generates a more complex set of anxieties and political reactions in immigrant-destination countries than do inflows of either goods or capital.
Political contention over immigration in destination countries is rooted
in concerns over cultural change, competition in the labor market, and the
burden newcomers who need schooling, housing, medical treatment, and
other costly benefits place on society. Trade, of course, is contentious too.
But in terms of organized politics, those groups interested in free trade have
102
Access to public benefits changes the equation: the easier it is to access public benefits, the
greater the concerns about immigration. For an article that seeks entirely to explain the trade–
immigration differential in such terms, see Dietmar Wellisch & Uwe Walz, Why Do Rich Countries Prefer Free Trade Over Free Migration? The Role of the Modern Welfare State, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 1595
(1998).
103
See Hatton, supra note 5, at 373.
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been more successful in moving their agenda through the political process
than those interested in more open migration.104 This in part reflects the fact
that those who most favor, and most stand to benefit from, more open immigration—migrants and their families—are less likely to be able to vote.
Consumers receive lower prices for services as a result of immigration, but
they may not identify those prices as a benefit of immigration, and in any
case their primary identity is unlikely to be as a ―consumer,‖ but rather as a
worker or community member who may see immigration as otherwise
harmful. In any case, consumers are too diffuse a constituency, with each
profiting to too small a degree, to be likely to organize as an effective proimmigration lobby. Dani Rodrik has argued that others who support liberalized immigration policy, such as employers of low-wage workers, have
trouble organizing and identifying themselves as beneficiaries ex ante, and
thus are not in a position to be effective proponents in the political
process.105 While the role of employer associations such as the Essential
Worker Immigration Coalition in advocating for new guest worker programs in the mid-2000s106 would seem to demonstrate otherwise, the fact
that firms were not able to overcome political opposition speaks to the suspicion with which they are viewed as spokespeople for a pro-immigrant position.
B. The Overall Economic Gains from Labor Migration Are Distributed
Differently than the Gains from Trade
The balance sheet from trade looks different from a developed country‘s perspective than the balance sheet from immigration. This is true in
two related regards: the net gain in national wealth generated by greater
openness appears to be greater for trade than for immigration, and—more
speculatively—the relative distribution between developed and developing
countries of the increase in global wealth may favor developed countries
more in the case of trade than in the case of immigration.
There is a near consensus view among economists that the fiscal impact of trade is a strong net positive from the perspective of all participating
countries.107 Economists acknowledge that there are distributional losers
104
See Eytan Meyers, Multilateral Cooperation in International Labor Migration 6 (Ctr. for Comparative Immigration Studies, Working Paper 61, 2002), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/
item/4zv454f5#page-1. Hatton notes, however, that ―public opinion is not very much more hostile to
letting in more immigrants than it is to letting in more imports.‖ See Hatton, supra note 5, at 346–55,
373.
105
See Rodrik, supra note 21, at 2 (―It is only after the worker has a specific job that the firm in
which he is employed develops a direct stake in keeping him in the country.‖).
106
See supra note 12. The EWIC calls for increased temporary migration programs to fill jobs ―that
most Americans take for granted but won‘t do themselves.‖ EWIC, 5 MYTHS REGARDING IMMIGRANTS
AND COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM IN THE U.S., http://www.clca.us/immigration/moreinfo
Docs/1.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2010).
107
See Robert Driskill, Deconstructing the Argument for Free Trade 1–2 (Feb. 2007) (unpublished
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within countries, but there has been little debate about the fundamental
point that national wealth increases through trade.108 In the case of immigration, the debate among economists about the fiscal impact on destination
countries is much more vigorous, although the weight of evidence appears
to be settling on a view that the overall financial impact of in-migration to
developed nations is a (small) net positive, or at least not meaningfully negative.109 The more vibrant debate remains with regard to the distributional
impact on those who compete directly with immigrants for jobs.110 Although their claims are contested, economists such as George Borjas have
argued that the small overall net positive impact of immigration is outweighed by a large negative impact on the distributional losers.111 The additional costs detailed above that are associated with the arrival of human bebeings instead of goods makes the analysis more complicated and renders
the net gains for destination countries slimmer than those that can be
achieved through trade.112
On a global level, the assertion that open migration, like open trade,
maximizes wealth says nothing about the distributional issue of who gets
the increased income. With regard to trade, academic economists have long
promoted the theory that the benefits of free trade flow at least equally to
developing countries and their citizens (and possibly principally to them),
and that free trade is a key engine for development.113 This message has
manuscript), available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/faculty/Driskill/Deconstructingfreetrade
Aug27a2007.pdf.
108
See id., passim. Driskill takes on the near consensus among economists on this point, asking,
―What does it mean for a change in economic circumstances to be ‗good for the nation as a whole‘, even
when some members of that nation are hurt by the change?‖ Id. at 2. He argues that economists would
do better to stay away from pronouncements about the net effects of trade, which are ―above their pay
grade,‖ and instead to concentrate on elaborating the trade-offs. Id. at 20
109
For overviews of the literature, see, for example, Julie Murray, Jeanne Batalova & Michael Fix,
The Impact of Immigration on Native Workers: A Fresh Look at the Evidence, 18 MIGRATION POL‘Y
INST. INSIGHT 1, 7 (2006); Trebilcock, supra note 6, at 277–80; Steven Raphael & Lucas Ronconi, The
Effects of Labor Market Competition with Immigrants on the Wages and Employment and
Natives 23 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://irle.berkeley.edu/cwed/ronconi/
immigration_existing_research.pdf.
110
See Murray, Batalova & Fix, supra note 109, at 3–5.
111
See, e.g., George J. Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the
Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1335, 1370 (2003); George J. Borjas, Increasing the Supply of Labor Through Immigration: Measuring the Impact on Native-Born Workers,
Backgrounder, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, May 2004, at 1, available at http://www.cis.org/
articles/2004/back504.pdf. But see David Card, Is the New Immigration Really So Bad? (Nat‘l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11547, 2005) (contesting Borjas‘s claims); see also David Card,
Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Labor Market Impacts of Higher Immigration, 19 J.
LAB. ECON. 22, 57–58 (2001) (arguing that immigration inflows have only a modest effect on the
wages of native workers in high immigration areas).
112
See Borjas, supra note 100, at 78.
113
For summaries of the arguments, see William R. Cline, Doha and Development, 84 FOREIGN
AFF. 67 (2005); David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 120 (2002); for a
more complex assessment and overview, see Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Warner, Economic Reform and
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been amplified in the policy world, most powerfully through the World
Bank and the World Trade Organization, as well as the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative and similar organs.114 Free trade as actually practiced,
however, has imposed significant conditions on developing nations.115 It
has also resulted in the massive displacement of rural workers in parts of
the developing world.116 As a result, although trade has been an important
contributor to the economic rise of some developing nations, in other places
it has significantly underperformed as a poverty-reduction strategy.117
Meanwhile, the transnational corporations that reap vast profits from trade
are overwhelmingly headquartered in developed countries. Wealthy nations
such as the United States have been able to insist on continuing subsidies
for domestic industries such as agriculture and ongoing trade barriers, while
prohibiting their less developed trading partners from acting in equivalent
ways. In this way, wealthy nations have benefitted financially from imposing conditions on weaker nations.118 The current structure of free trade assures that developed nations will continue to benefit significantly.119
the Process of Global Integration, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 1995, at 2 (―The
power of trade to promote economic convergence is perhaps the most venerable tenet of classical and
neoclassical economics.‖).
114
See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2002: MAKING TRADE WORK FOR THE
WORLD‘S POOR, at xii–xiv (2002); Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trade Facts: The Benefits of
Trade for Developing Countries (July 2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
uploads/factsheets/2008/asset_upload_file226_15014.pdf.
115
For a review of trade conditions imposed through multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade
agreements, concluding that free trade as currently practiced impairs the development of many poor
countries, and further that agreements negotiated by the United States leave poorer nations with the least
room to promote development and growth, see Rachel Denae Thrasher & Kevin Gallagher, 21st Century
Trade Agreements: Implications for Long-Run Development Policy 47 & passim (Frederick S. Pardee
Ctr. for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, The Pardee Papers No. 2, 2008), available at
http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/KGPardeePolSpaceSep08.pdf.
One example of a condition on trade that will impose billions of dollars in costs on developing nations is the TRIPS provisions in the WTO, which require that developing nations pay royalties and licensing fees to comply with patent and copyright protections. ―The World Bank‘s estimates indicate
that the cost of TRIPS to developing countries is likely to be comparable to any gains they might receive
from trade liberalization.‖ Mark Weisbrot & Dean Baker, The Relative Impact of Trade Liberalization
on Developing Countries 137 (Ctr. for Econ. & Pol‘y Research, 2002), reprinted in THE DEVELOPMENT
IMPERATIVE: TOWARD A PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACH 135, 137 (Eric Hershberg & Christy Thornton
eds., 2005).
116
For a description of this effect in the context of NAFTA, see supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
117
For an overview of the conditions under which trade is likely to succeed (or fail) as a povertyreduction strategy, see Chantal Thomas, Poverty Reduction, Trade, and Rights, 18 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV.
1399, 1401–15 (2003). On the ways that developing countries that have experienced growth through
trade have not always followed free trade orthodoxy, see Thrasher & Gallagher, supra note 115, at 7–11.
118
See STIGLITZ, supra note 8, at 6–7, 61–62; Chantal Thomas, Democratic Governance, Distributive Justice and Development, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Chi
Carmody, Frank Garcia & John Linarelli eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 7–8, on file with author);
Thrasher & Gallagher, supra note 115, at 47 & passim.
119
See STIGLITZ, supra note 8, at 7.
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By contrast—assuming economists are correct in asserting that the
global wealth-maximizing benefits of increased labor mobility dwarf those
to be had from more open trade—it appears that the largest share of those
benefits go to origin nations and to migrants themselves, particularly with
regard to low-skilled migrants.120 From a macro perspective, economists
who have modeled increased labor migration have found that the most dramatic increase in income from freer movement of low-skilled workers
would flow to origin nations, particularly to migrants and their families. 121
Actors in destination country economies also stand to gain through more
open movement of workers across borders, both through profit to firms that
hire those workers at reduced wages, and through the consumers who are
able to purchase services and some goods at lower prices.122 In a world driven by economic theory, the net economic gain to be had through immigration should be sufficient to drive developed countries‘ interests in pursuing
it, even if migrants and origin countries are relatively larger beneficiaries.
But from the perspective of the domestic politics of destination countries,
the gains do not appear to be large or certain enough to overcome the reluctance caused by the social, cultural, and distributional concerns identified
above, or the political obstacles imposed by the lack of reciprocity I note in
the following section.

120
See Walmsley & Winters, supra note 21, at 690 (―In general, developing countries gain most
from the increase in quotas, with higher gains from the increase in quotas on unskilled labour than on
skilled labour.‖); GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006, supra note 2, at 31, 41. High-skilled labor migrants offer significant benefits to destination countries. See Neeraj Kaushal & Michael Fix, The Contributions of High-Skilled Immigrants, MIGRATION POLICY INST., INSIGHT, July 2006, at 1, 1–2,
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TF16_Kaushal.pdf; TRACHTMAN, supra note 6, at
48–50. While high-skilled emigration can still deliver remittance income and other financial benefits to
origin countries, it raises concerns about the drain of the limited pool of skilled workers in those countries, and has potentially serious long-term negative impacts on those countries‘ economies and future
growth. See Walmsley & Winters, supra note 21, at 713. Contesting this claim, see Trebilcock, supra
note 6, at 282–84.
121
See Hatton, supra note 5, at 360 (―[T]he largest gains from migration accrue to the migrants
themselves.‖); TRACHTMAN, supra note 6, at 48; Walmsley & Winters, supra note 21, at 723; ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK, supra note 67, at 77, 84, 90–92; GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006, supra
note 2, at 34–38; Dani Rodrik, Feasible Globalizations 19–21 (KSG Working Paper Series RWP02-029,
July 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=349021.
It is important to note that migration entails serious—indeed often devastating—costs for migrants
and for the countries, communities, and families that they leave behind. For an overview of some of
these costs from the Mexican perspective, see NUEVAS TENDENCIAS Y DESAFIOS DE LA MIGRACION
INTERNACIONAL MEXICO–ESTADOS UNIDOS [NEW TRENDS AND CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL
MEXICO–UNITED STATES MIGRATION] (Raúl Delgado Wise & Margarita Favela eds., 2004). Also, to
say that global migration results in an increase in global wealth, a good proportion of which goes to migrants, is not to say that it is the only way to achieve this end or to endorse it as a solution to the world‘s
problems or as a road to sustainable development.
122
See supra discussion Part IV (introductory portion).
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C. Trade Is Reciprocal, Immigration Is Not
A key difference between trade and migration is that trade tends to be
reciprocal, involving both imports and exports, while the flow of workers
usually goes one way only. While in a pure importation scenario a developed country might weigh the downsides to trade in ways similar to the disadvantages of immigration, trade is rarely (and in the case of developed
nations, never) a one-way street. From the perspective of developed nations, however, labor migration is nearly a pure importation scenario, because large numbers of citizens of wealthier states do not seek opportunities
to migrate for work to less developed countries.123
In the trade context, economists argue that the gains to be had from
importation are considerable even in the absence of a reciprocal deal; as a
result they call for the unilateral abandonment of tariffs.124 But politically,
this has proven unacceptable. Indeed, the usual political argument in favor
of trade relies almost exclusively on the benefits of export: trade will open
up new markets for domestically produced products.125 This argument,
which treats imports as a necessary evil, is not available in the case of labor
migration. In the immigration context, although economists would still argue that unilateral abandonment of restrictions would be beneficial, the quid
pro quo that sells trade is missing. This becomes an obstacle in the domestic politics of immigration in developed countries.
D. Wealthier Nations Have Unilateral Alternatives to Negotiating with
Origin Nations over Labor Migration
A final way that the global movement of capital and goods differs from
the movement of people is that the free flow of investment and trade requires cooperation between less and more developed countries, while wealthier nations can obtain all of the labor they want (and more) through
unilateral action. For capital mobility, firms in wealthier nations are reluctant to assume the risks of making investments in less-developed countries
without assurances that they will be safe from burdensome requirements regarding sourcing and sales, protected from expropriation, and granted all
the privileges accorded to national firms and investors—all of which require guarantees from the capital-receiving nation. For trade, firms in wealthier nations want unfettered access to developing markets, and their
governments recognize that they must negotiate with the governments of
the less-developed countries to receive the freedom from tariffs that they
seek.

123

See Hatton, supra note 5, at 364–67.
See Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE
113, 113 (1997).
125
See Hatton, supra note 5, at 366–67; Krugman, supra note 124, at 113.
124
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In the case of labor migration, however, developed country governments can legislate whatever sort of immigration program they desire without engaging any developing countries at all. The imbalance between the
absolute number of would-be migrant job-seekers around the world and the
number of migrants that developed countries are willing to admit is so great
that developed countries have little fear that their labor needs will suffer if
one or more origin countries declines to participate in a unilaterally implemented program. Furthermore, when a developed country unilaterally
creates a temporary migration program open to migrants from all countries,
it can avoid the foreign relations pitfalls of appearing to favor one developing nation over others.126
Timothy Hatton has argued that the lack of reciprocity in the immigration context, discussed above, accounts for developed countries‘ preference
for unilateral action.127 Hatton notes that destination and origin countries
typically have asymmetrical and opposing goals: destination countries seek
to limit immigration, and origin countries seek more opportunities for their
citizens to find work abroad.128 Because of the vast global wage gap and the
oversupply of worldwide low-wage workers relative to worldwide available
jobs, negotiating to expand labor migration is likely to be of far less interest
to developed countries than to their developing counterparts.129 Hatton asks
whether origin countries might have something else to offer that might
bring destination countries to the table, such as regional coordination
around trade, but finds it unlikely that such agreements would bring the
poorest and the richest countries into relationships with each other.130
Yet reciprocity alone appears inadequate as an explanatory framework
for the weakness of inter-country cooperation without an understanding of
the power dynamics among the countries and of the more powerful country‘s capapcity to achieve its goals through unilateral action. Reciprocity is
an incomplete justification in the first case because accords are rarely perfectly symmetrical: even in the case of trade flows, while both country A
and country B want access to each other‘s markets for the sale of goods, the
benefits are likely to be differentially distributed. In addition, future interests need to be taken into account: although capital flow, like labor migration, is not usually characterized by mirror image reciprocity (ordinarily,
Country A has more investors with capital, and Country B is more interested in capital inflows), it is unquestionable true that developing countries
126
See WORLD MIGRATION 2008, supra note 73, at 380–83. Most destination nations that negotiate
BLMAs do so as a supplement to unilaterally adopted legislation governing permanent and temporary
immigration. It is important to note, though, that there are countries such as Spain and Canada (and indeed much of the EU prior to enlargement) that appear to use BLMAs as the primary way to address
their temporary labor migration needs.
127
See Hatton, supra note 5, at 364–68.
128
Id.
129
See Meyers, supra note 104, at 6.
130
See Hatton, supra note 5, at 370–72.
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and their wealthy nationals have long anticipated seeking, and increasingly
do pursue, investment opportunities abroad.
I believe the disparity is more fully explained by asking whether the
flow in question requires a high degree of inter-country cooperation to
achieve what the more powerful country wants from the exchange, or
whether it has alternative means to reach the same end. In this broader
view of trade and capital flows, wealthier countries need something from
their poorer counterparts in order to achieve their goals, but they do not
have recourse to a unilateral option. Firms in wealthy Country A want
access to poorer Country B‘s markets for their exports, but cannot achieve
this goal unless Country A negotiates with Country B and gets Country B to
lower its tariffs. Wealthy Country A‘s investors seek investment opportunities abroad, but in order to proceed they require that their government obtain guarantees from Country B that their investments will be safe from
expropriation. In each of these cases, there is both the genuine possibility
of reciprocity and the lack of a unilateral alternative: Country B, although
the weaker party, also desires access to Country A‘s markets and investment opportunities, and is in a position to demand reciprocal guarantees
from Country A because Country A has no choice but to negotiate with
County B in order to realize Country A‘s goals. In the labor migration context, both factors are absent. There is little clamor from workers within
wealthy Country A for opportunities to work in less developed countries.
And to the extent that Country A wants more foreign workers, it can
achieve this goal unilaterally by creating a labor migration program that
suits its own needs. It neither seeks reciprocal privileges from origin countries nor, given the large number of countries eager for remittance income,
must it negotiate for the cooperation of specific countries to fill its labor
needs.
V. IF IMMIGRATION IS SO DIFFERENT, WHY IS THE NUMBER OF
BILATERAL LABOR MIGRATION AGREEMENTS GROWING?
Taken together, the reasons destination nations are reluctant to bargain
over low-wage labor migration are so persuasive that they raise the question
of why a destination country would ever agree to such an accord. If destination nations will negotiate with origin nations over temporary labor migration only when they can do better through collaboration than they can
through unilateral regulation, the real mystery is why bilateral migration
deals are struck at all. What do destination countries want that makes bargaining over labor migration desirable?
One answer is that, in exchange for migration agreements, developed
countries can receive concessions on other matters, unrelated to migration.
Social scientists such as Timothy Hatton and Eytan Meyers have suggested
that destination nations are most likely to consider free movement agreements that encompass low-wage workers when they are tied to other forms
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of regional economic integration—especially where such integration assures destination nations access to the markets of origin nations for trade
and investment purposes.131 Indeed, Meyers points out, ―all multilateral
agreements on the free movement of unskilled labor are an integral part of
regional integration schemes. All such agreements, either on unskilled or
skilled labor, are also linked to free trade agreements.‖132 Yet only the EU
nations have achieved a regional arrangement that encompasses all forms of
labor migration without restrictions by skill level. EU integration is a
longstanding, unique, and complex phenomenon, and cannot be easily replicated in other regions.133
Bilateral labor agreements are generally independent of agreements on
trade and other forms of economic integration,134 so they require a different
explanation. The most obvious goal of destination nations in signing bilateral migration agreements is to meet labor needs without addressing the issues of immigrant integration or citizenship that a permanent immigration
program raises. This is particularly true for low-wage jobs that ―natives
won‘t do,‖ classically agricultural or seasonal labor; and in high-skilled
fields where there are structural native labor shortages. What remains perplexing, however, is why destination countries would prefer bilaterally negotiated agreements for implementing a temporary labor program instead of
a unilateral alternative.135
The most commonly floated possibility is that bilateral accords allow
destination nations to enlist the cooperation of origin countries in controlling illegal migration.136 In the past fifteen years, some destination coun131

See Hatton, supra note 5, at 366–72; Meyers, supra note 104, at 17–18.
Meyers, supra note 104, at 4; see also id. at 21 (―Regional integration schemes are especially unlikely to encompass the free movement of unskilled labor when (a) the degree of economic development
among countries is highly asymmetrical, and (b) when the country of destination is already the uncontested regional hegemon, and does not require access to the markets of the countries of origin.‖).
133
The creation of a free movement regime among European nations is historically contingent and
path-dependent, and therefore difficult to use as a model to predict how other nations might ultimately
reach a similar result. Nonetheless, once the EU fully implements open labor migration within its borders, its experience will have important lessons to offer to future regional migration agreements in other
places. I will be exploring the EU‘s post-enlargement experience with low-wage labor migration in a
future article.
134
For discussion of numerous bilateral labor migration agreements with no link to trade, see INT‘L
ORG. FOR MIGRATION, LABOUR MIGRATION IN ASIA 85–86 (2003).
135
There is little domestic pressure in most destination countries to negotiate such programs with
origin countries instead of creating them independently. Because such programs tend to be politically
unpopular in destination countries, there is little demand for them in general, other than from firms seeking cheaper labor.
136
See Bobeva & Garson, supra note 76, at 7, 16; Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga, A General
Model of Bilateral Migration Agreements 16 (Sept. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2008/75508.pdf (arguing that destination countries permit legal migration in exchange for the origin country‘s cooperation in controlling migration at the border); Francisco Javier Moreno, The Evolution Of Immigration Policies in Spain: Between External Constraints and Domestic
Demand for Unskilled Labour 25 (Univ. of Barcelona, Working Paper No. 2004/211, 2004), available at
132
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tries have begun to use BLMAs as a framework through which to negotiate
a ―shared responsibility‖ approach to migration with origin nations. In exchange for the legal admittance of some migrants, they enlist origin countries in the monitoring of emigration from the origin country, commit origin
countries to patrol shared borders, and bind them to take back their nationals who are deported as unauthorized migrants from the destination country.
For example, a recent agreement between Spain and Morocco requires Morocco to police unauthorized migrants from other African countries passing
through its borders on their way north, rendering Morocco a ―buffer zone‖
between Europe and the poorer countries to the south.137 This explanation
accords with a worldwide trend toward the ―management‖ of migration
through cooperation between origin and destination countries.138 At the
same time, few BLMAs appear to be structured in this way.
Another explanation relates to ease of experimentation. Although we
ordinarily think of unilateral action by a government as simpler to achieve
than a bilateral negotiation, this may not always be true. Because BLMAs
have no enforcement provisions and therefore impose no formal consequences for suspension or violations, they may be perceived by destination
governments as low-cost commitments that are easier to create and abandon
than unilateral programs that require legislative action.139 The numbers of
migrants admitted under BLMAs tend to be small relative to total labor migration, and the agreements are often barely publicized, so destination nations may view these agreements as an opportunity for below-the-radar
experimentation with different ways to structure the flow of immigrants.
BLMAs provide a low-profile forum for destination nations to offer new
rights or impose new restrictions, incorporate new actors such as civil sohttp://www.march.es/ceacs/publicaciones/working/archivos/2004_211.pdf; Marion Panizzon, Bilateral
Migration Agreements and the GATS: Sharing Responsibility Versus Reciprocity 25–27 (Soc‘y of Int.
Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 44/08, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156842 (arguing for the principle of ―shared responsibility,‖ under which governments facing a high influx of undocumented migrants open routes to legal migration through bilateral
migration agreements, in order to enlist origin countries in the process of curbing illegal migration).
137
See Moreno, supra note 136, at 25 (noting that in 1992 Spain negotiated a bilateral agreement
with Morocco, through which Spain granted Moroccans certain migration privileges and in exchange
required Morocco to agree to control unauthorized migrants passing through Morocco from other African countries).
138
See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK, supra note 67, at 89–90; INT‘L ORG. FOR MIGRATION,
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND EXPERIENCES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION 22 (2006); GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006, supra note 2, at 70–75.
139
Although formal sanctions are not the only ones available in international relations, origin countries seem particularly reluctant to make waves through informal diplomatic channels for the violation of
labor migration agreements. See Gordon, Restructuring Labor Migration, supra note 88, at 17. For an
example of this reluctance in action, see the description of the Philippine government‘s reaction to the
abuse of Filipino migrant workers in Brunei in ROBYN RODRIGUEZ, MIGRANTS FOR EXPORT: HOW THE
PHILIPPINE STATE BROKERS LABOR TO THE WORLD (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at ch. 6, on file
with author).
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ciety organizations into the migration process, or collaborate with origin
governments in new ways. This has been particularly evident in the context
of the enforcement of workplace rights for migrants.140
Finally, BLMAs may allow destination countries to advance certain
historical or political relationships, or cultural goals.141 This is reflected in
cases where destination countries sign agreements with former colonies that
are geographically remote rather than with potential migration partners
nearby.142 While BLMAs can unquestionably serve meaningful political
and foreign relations ends, as well as less weighty cultural purposes, under
such circumstances migration becomes a secondary issue.143 The question
this raises is whether bilateral agreements on migration negotiated under an
overwhelming imbalance of power, and signed to promote non-migration
goals, will result in a rational or distributionally just mechanism for governing the movement of workers across borders.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has sought to explain the gap between the global regulation
of labor migration and that of trade and capital flows. This is a question of
first impression in the legal literature and one that has received scant attention elsewhere. And yet the analytical demands of that task pale beside the
normative challenge of setting out an alternative.
A number of policymakers—including the World Bank—have recently
sought to extend into the policy realm the theoretical insight that trade and
labor migration function similarly. They have argued that labor migration,
like trade, is an important engine for the development of poor countries. 144
These advocates for ―migration as development‖ argue that the global bene-

140

See Gordon, Restructuring Labor Migration, supra note 88, at 13–15.
See Bobeva & Garson, supra note 76, at 15; PHILIP MARTIN, MANOLO ABELLA & CHRISTIANE
KUPTSCH, MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 97–98 (2006); Meyers, supra note 104, at 20–21 (arguing that destination countries agree to the free regional movement of workers in exchange for trade access to developing markets. A broader example of this phenomenon lies in
the origins of the EU, which was founded in the wake of World War II in order to bind European countries together economically to prevent future world wars pitting European nations against each other.
The negotiation of free movement of workers between EU countries was a secondary outgrowth of this
impulse, rather than an independent motivating force.
142
Examples include Spain‘s pursuit of agreements with its former South American colonies, including Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador, see Moreno, supra note 136, at 24, and
France‘s accord with Algeria, see Henri de Lary, Bilateral Labour Agreements Concluded by France, in
MIGRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT, supra note 75, at 43, 46.
143
While BLMAs could, in theory, serve meaningful foreign relations goals (such as averting wars
or significantly enhancing national security), I am not aware of a BLMA negotiated with such a weighty
end as its foremost purpose. By contrast, regional agreements such as the EU are more likely to be able
to make credible claims that the migration they permit is an essential, if secondary, part of a larger political package. See supra discussion note 141.
144
See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
141
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fits of more liberal labor migration policies would dwarf all other forms of
foreign aid.145
The ―migration as development‖ perspective understates labor migration‘s considerable costs.146 Migration has a high price for migrants themselves, both in financial and deeply human terms, as they uproot themselves
from their families and undertake a dangerous journey. Children are separated from parents for months, years, or a lifetime. Migrants‘ communities
of origin are depleted and their home countries lose the brain power and
spark of some of their most talented and determined residents. Migration
can have social costs for the country migrants arrive in and distributional
costs for the workers they compete with there. On an empirical level, a
number of policy experts have challenged the assertion that the vast flow of
remittances to origin countries has resulted in meaningful development, instead noting that the bulk of the money appears to flow to consumption and
to construction projects of limited impact and utility.147 A final concern is
that remittance income and the relief it provides from underemployment
and other economic pressures has allowed the governments of both developing countries and developed countries to avoid investing in long-term
sustainable economic growth in poor countries, so that the choice not to migrate will be a realistic option for more people.148
145
The OECD nations gave a total of nearly $119.8 billion in direct aid to developing nations in
2008, a significant increase over previous years. Press Release, OECD, Development Aid at Its Highest
Level Ever in 2008 (Mar. 30, 2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/35/
0,3343,en_2649_34487_42458595_1_1_1_1,00.html. This is still considerably less than the predictions
for the benefits to be had from either liberalized trade or liberalized migration. See supra notes 22–23
and accompanying text; see also Bob Hamilton & John Whalley, Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility, 14 J. DEV. ECON. 61, 74 (1984) (arguing that the ―dramatic [positive] effects on worldwide equality which are possible from modifying immigration
restrictions . . . are much larger, for instance, than those likely from increases in aid flows to Lima target
levels‖). For the World Bank‘s argument that migration and, in particular, migrant remittances are a key
driver of development, see GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006, supra note 2, at 117–29.
146
For a summary of the arguments on both sides in the migration and development debate, see Alejandro Portes, Migration and Development: Reconciling Opposite Views, 32 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUD.
5 (2009).
147
In an overview of the literature on remittances and development, Hein de Haas concludes that
―[m]igration and remittances, if anything, are an investment in social security by households and families. However, migration and remittances are too limited in scale and too fragmented to remove more
general development constraints.‖ Hein de Haas, Remittances, Migration, and Social Development: A
Conceptual Review of the Literature 27 (United Nations Research Inst. for Soc. Dev., Programme Paper
No. 34, 2007), available at http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Remittances_Migration_and_
social_Development.pdf.
148
On the relationship between sustained economic growth and the slowing or cessation of outmigration, see Douglas S. Massey, Patterns and Processes of International Migration in the 21st Century, 17–18, 27 (June 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://pum.princeton.edu/
pumconference/papers/1-Massey.pdf.
The ―right to not migrate,‖ coupled with a call for sustainable development, has become a rallying
cry for activists in immigrant origin countries. See, e.g., David Bacon, The Right to Stay Home—
Derecho de No Migrar, NEW AM. MEDIA NEWS REPORT, July 09, 2008, http://
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Migration, then, may not be the best road to development. But in the
extraordinarily unequal and highly mobile world in which we live, for the
foreseeable future some movement of people in search of work is inevitable. The real question is not whether the costs outweigh the benefits, but
whether and how we can structure the flow to minimize the losses and fairly
distribute the global gains. In that regard, a top-down approach might be to
bring the movement of workers within the WTO framework, or to create a
parallel ―WMO.‖149 Jagdish Bhagwati, who originally proposed the creation of a World Migration Organization on the WTO model, has argued that
such an institution could coordinate the diffusion of ―best practice‖ immigration policies and induce restrictionist countries to permit greater openness.150 A locally rooted, transnationally coordinated model that I have
proposed elsewhere, called Transnational Labor Citizenship, offers a more
bottom-up response to these concerns.151 Transnational Labor Citizenship
would link the right to migrate for work to a commitment by migrants and
governments to enforce baseline workplace standards in destination countries, and would create cross-border networks of migrants and their organizations to further the goal of ensuring that both migrants and native workers
labor under decent conditions.
In addition, although it arose from unique circumstances and its model
cannot be cloned, we have a great deal to learn from the EU—the only regional arrangement in the world that permits unrestricted freedom of
movement for work among its member states at all skill levels, 152 despite
wage disparities as high as sixteen to one between its wealthiest and poorest
member nations, more than twice that of the United States and Mexico.153
news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=66a8eccf43428bfe3542bfc7ddfb19ff.
149
Bhagwati, supra note 58. For further consideration of the WMO possibility, see Hatton, supra
note 5, at 368–73, and TRACHTMAN, supra note 6, at 325–29.
150
Bhagwati, supra note 58, at 104.
151
See Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007); Jennifer
Gordon, Op-Ed., Workers Without Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, at A27.
152
Although original member states are currently able to apply transitional restrictions on the labor
mobility of nationals from EU member states admitted in 2004 and 2007, those restrictions expire seven
years after admission, at which point full labor mobility becomes the rule. See Free Movement of Workers, EUROPEAN COMM‘N, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=458&langId=en (last visited Aug. 8,
2010).
153
This disparity is important to note in response to critics who claim that the EU is a grouping of
developed nations, and has little to say to efforts to bring developed and less-developed countries into a
freer migration relationship. Although measures vary, by most estimates the wage gap between the
poorest and wealthiest EU countries is greater than the disparity in earnings between the U.S. and Mexico. Hamish McRae, EU Enlargement May Prove to Be Better for Some than for Others, INDEP., Aug.
7, 2003, at 20 (noting that ―[t]he average pay in the biggest three accession countries by population,
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, is just 13 per cent of UK levels,‖ representing a wage ratio of
between 1:7 and 1:8). According to Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU, in 2006, just prior to
accession in 2007, hourly labor costs in Romania were at a 1:10 ratio and in Bulgaria at a 1:16 ratio
compared to those in the UK. My calculations are based on Eurostat table, Hourly Labour Costs,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00173&plugin
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The EU‘s approach to immigration is far from a panacea. There has been
resistance to the implementation of more open labor migration from citizens
of the longer-standing EU countries in the wake of enlargement, and the
global recession has limited work opportunities in the more developed EU
countries even as it has increased migration pressures in the less-developed
new Member States.154 It is of particular concern that the EU‘s treatment of
migrants from outside of Europe is increasingly harsh and dissonant with
the justice principles it has sought to apply within its boundaries. For all of
its limitations and complications, the post-enlargement EU regime nonetheless represents a natural experiment with a labor migration framework that
offers full mobility and equal rights in a context of significant wage disparities between origin and destination countries.155 Within its borders, the
EU‘s treatment of trade, investment, and labor migration offers a vision of
regional coordination that is both coherent and closer to fair than anything
else yet implemented.
There is a fundamental inconsistency in the differentiated way that the
world‘s powerful nations seek to govern the flow of money, goods, and
people across borders. Millions of people have responded to that inconsistency by migrating illegally, creating a crisis of undocumented immigration
in almost every developed nation around the globe. This Essay has sought
to highlight this puzzle from an economic perspective and to explain it in
terms of international and domestic politics. The next step is to respond to
those political realities with solutions that recognize the inevitability of ongoing global labor migration in years to come, and seek to address the concerns standing in the way of greater regional cooperation and openness.

=1 (last visited Aug. 8, 2010). The wage differential between the United States and Mexico is often estimated at 17%, or approximately 1:6. See, e.g., JUS SEMPER GLOBAL ALLIANCE, MEXICO‘S WAGE GAP
CHARTS 8 (Dec. 2008), http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/Labour%20Resources/WGC/Resources/
WagegapsMex2006.pdf. Important differences still remain, however, notably the greater racial and ethnic homogeneity between EU countries as compared to the United States and Mexico.
154
See DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU, MADELEINE SUMPTION & WILL SOMERVILLE, MIGRATION
POLICY INST., MIGRATION AND THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN: WHAT TO EXPECT IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 2–6 (2009), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/transatlantic/EU_Recession_backgrounder.pdf.
155
I will explore the EU‘s labor migration regime and the lessons it offers for the redesign of global
and U.S. labor migration in a future article.
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